Real-world scenes are complex but lawful: blenders are more likely to be found in kitchens than beaches, and elephants are not generally found inside homes. Research over the past 40 years has demonstrated that contextual associations influence object recognition, change eye movement distributions, and modulate brain activity. However, the majority of these studies choose object-scene pairs from experimenters' intuitions because the statistical relationships between objects and scenes had yet to be systematically quantified. How do intuitive estimations compare to actual object frequencies? Across six experiments, observers estimated the frequency with which an object is found in a particular environment, such as the frequency of ''mug" in an office. Estimated frequencies were compared to observed frequencies in two fully labeled scene databases (Greene, 2013). Although inter-observer similarity was high, observers systematically overestimated object frequency by an average of 32% across experiments. Altogether, these results speak to the richness of scene schemata and to the necessity of measuring object frequencies.
Introduction
In the last 40 years, a growing body of research has highlighted our remarkable scene understanding capabilities (Biederman, 1972; Greene & Oliva, 2009; Intraub, 1981; Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Potter & Levy, 1969; Potter, Wyble, Hagmann, & McCourt, 2014; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996) . These results present challenges to leading theories of visual perception that are built on results from sparse laboratory displays. Specifically, visual search appears to be more efficient in scenes (Wolfe, Alvarez, Rosenholtz, Kuzmova, & Sherman, 2011) compared to unstructured displays, and our recall for complex scenes is no worse than that of single objects (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010) . It has been proposed that stored knowledge of scene-object relations aids these abilities (Bar, 2004; Wolfe, Võ, Evans, & Greene, 2011) , but testing this hypothesis requires knowing both the strength of the contextual relations, and extent to which human observers accurately encode them. While recent work has addressed the first issue by characterizing the statistical frequencies of objects in scenes (Greene, 2013), the current work aims to address the second: how accurate are human object frequency estimates?
I asked human observers to estimate the frequency with which they would find various objects in different environments. I then compared these estimates to the observed frequencies from the Greene (2013) databases. Several possible patterns of results may be expected. On one hand, we readily learn statistical relationships and contingencies from visual displays (Brady & Oliva, 2008; Brockmole & Võ, 2010; Chun & Jiang, 1998) , and our frequency estimates of physical entities is generally good (Attneave, 1953; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . Furthermore, scene and object recognition are subject to strong contextual effects (Davenport & Potter, 2004) even though the contextual relationships are experimenterdefined. Taken together, these results would predict near-veridical estimations of object frequency.
Contrastingly, human frequency estimation in other domains can be badly skewed. Highly representative items can cause observers to discount prior probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) , we exhibit an optimistic bias when estimating task durations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977) , and we overestimate salient, low probability events such as airplane crashes (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978) . Within vision, our place memories are schematic, and observers often report objects in a display that, while absent, fit within the scene context (Brewer & Treyans, 1981; Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001) . Similarly, we tend to remember a more expansive scene view than was presented (boundary extension, (Intraub & Richardson, 1989) ), suggesting that our memories reflect constructions and simulations of the environment as a whole. These results predict that our estimates of object frequency may be overestimated.
Here, I demonstrate that human estimates of object frequency are consistently overestimated, despite high agreement between observers. This holds over experiments held in the laboratory
